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Introduction
In his marvellous novel, The Storyteller,' Mario Vargas Llosa tells three interrelated 
stories using two distinct narrative voices. The first voice is authorial, an author 
close to Vargas Llosa himself: a Peruvian writer fascinated by the process of 
storytelling and by questions of identity. The second voice is much more 
mysterious, the voice of Tasurinchi, a Machiguengas Indian storyteller -  or so it 
seems. I give away very little of the plot by telling you that Tasurinchi is not who 
he appears. Or is he? Tasurinchi tells part of his own story, but more importantly 
he tells the story of the Machiguengas. Tasurinchi begins his life as Saul Zuratas, 
a Peruvian Jew with a deforming birthmark on one side of his face. He is a 
university pal o f the Peruvian author. Because of the deformity, Saùl’s nickname 
is “Mascarita”, the mask. It turns out that the mask of deformity is far less relevant 
than Saùl’s later adopted mask as a Machiguengas storyteller. Or is it?
My enigmatic questions hint at the mysterious reflections of this work of genius. 
Vargas Llosa is preoccupied by what shapes our identities, and the respective roles 
of inheritance and will. He is also preoccupied by the power of the story, and the 
storyteller, in transmitting and creating social myths that shape communal identity 
and promote social cohesion. Can one be simultaneously inside and outside a given 
society? If one is, in some sense, an outsider, can one ever feel truly integrated in 
a “foreign” society? What is the role o f stories in enabling social integration?
Consider the words of the great American legal theorist, Lon Fuller, addressing 
the role of the judge -  at least in the common law tradition:
[the judge] ought to be proud that his [or her] contribution is such that it cannot be
said with certainty whether it is something new or only the better telling o f an old
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story.2
Like the Machiguengas stoiyteller, the judge tells stories about history, obligation, 
aspiration, and our communal lives together. The judge can never be sure how much 
of the story she tells is inherited and how much is new creation. How much of the 
judge’s identity is found in tradition and how much is found in self-willing?
To connect these seemingly random thoughts, I must invoke the recent writings 
of a well-known American international lawyer, David Kennedy of Harvard 
University. Kennedy argues that international law should root its objects and 
methodology in new approaches to comparative law.3 Instead of being concerned 
with “governance”, international law should strive for cultural understanding. For 
Kennedy, current international law aspires inappropriately to transcend culture. I 
accept the validity of this critique, but would reject the conclusions that Kennedy 
draws, largely because he is firmly committed to dichotomous thinking. 
International law is either inside our system -  treated as binding -  or by implication, 
international law is best seen as “foreign” law that needs to be translated into 
domestic systems and interpreted into local culture.4 My argument is that 
international law is both outside and in. It is not only a foreign story but is part of 
our story. So those charged with relating the story of international law in Canada are 
best analogized to storytellers, rather than to translators. Like most stoiytellers, they 
are preoccupied with questions of identity and human social relationships. The 
telling of the story can build identity and social cohesion. In Canada, the story of 
international law is about us and about others. Our story of international law must 
be read with other “foreign” narratives. In more traditional terms, Canadian 
interpretation and implementation o f international law builds international law even 
outside our borders. So international law is inside and out.
This returns us to the story of Saùl Zuratas. While studying law and ethnology 
in university, Saùl discovers the Indians of Amazonia. He becomes fixated with 
their struggle to maintain identity in the face of the economic and cultural 
expansionism of white Peruvian -  implying Western -  society. One day Saùl 
disappears. The story circulates that he has made aliyah to Israel. However, over
2 L.L. Fuller, The Law in Quest o f Itself (Chicago: The Foundation Press, 1940) at 140.
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time it emerges that Saùl has instead gone deep into Amazonia, severing his 
connections to the world he knew in Lima and becoming a Machiguengas. We do 
not know of Saùl’s early days with the tribe, but learn that he is accepted when he 
discovers that he is viewed as a storyteller:
One day, as I arrived to visit a family, I heard them saying behind my back: “Here 
comes the storyteller. Let’s go listen to him.” It surprised me a lot. “Are you 
talking about me?” I asked. “Ehé,ehé, it’s you we’re talking about”. So there I was
-  the storyteller. I was thunderstruck. There I was. My heart was like a drum. 
Banging away in my chest. Boom Boom. Had I met my destiny? Perhaps.5
Telling a story is rewarding. It is rich with implications for the speaker and the 
listener, and for their relationship.
The Story of International Law in Canada
Who tells the story of international law in Canada? In a sense, we all do, or at least 
we are all potential storytellers. Every refugee claimant, every person who invokes 
an internationally recognized right, every lawyer who argues from international 
sources, every law professor who writes as an “eminent publicist” (to quote art. 38 
of the Statute oflnternational Court o f  Justice), every environmentalist who speaks 
of sustainable development or precaution -  we all tell part of the story of 
international law.
For the sake of precision, we must focus on two formal legal actors, the 
legislature and the courts, in their storytelling roles. Have their stories about 
international law shaped our identity and helped to bind our society together? My 
short answer is “yes, to some extent, but they could both do better. Their stories are 
not as compelling as they could be.” Let me explain.
First, a few basic propositions. It is trite law that international treaties are not 
“self-executing” in Canada. Our dualist constitutional framework requires the 
transformation of treaties by legislative action within the strictures of the division 
o f powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.6 Like most “trite” law, this 
brief résumé masks as much as it reveals. On the other hand, no one could ever
5 Supra note 1 at 210.
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describe the law concerning the interplay of international customary law and 
Canadian domestic law as “trite”. “Confused” and “incoherent” would be more apt 
descriptors.
A detailed analysis of the status within domestic law of treaties ratified by 
Canada is now required. The power to conclude treaties is vested in the Govemor- 
in-Council as delegated authority under the Royal Prerogative.7 Nonetheless, as 
Justice Rand stated in Francis v. R.,% in the absence of a constitutional provision 
declaring a treaty to be the law of the state, legislative transformation of the 
international obligation is required to implement the obligation within domestic law. 
With the continuing vitality of the Labour Conventions case, we also know that 
transformation must take place within the jurisdictional confines of the Constitution 
Act 1867.9 Unlike in Australia, there is no independent federal treaty 
implementation power.10
The key question is what constitutes “transformation”? Here the story of 
international treaty law in Canada becomes complex, and the other formal storyteller
-  the courts -  joins in the narrative. In a narrow sense, transformation is an explicit 
legislative act through which Parliament or a provincial legislature adopts the treaty 
obligation and implements it within Canadian law. But even with this narrow 
understanding, practice is diverse. A treaty text may be incorporated directly by 
reproducing all or part of the treaty within a statute, either in its body or as a
7 See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada Loose-leaf Edition, vol. 1 (Scarborough: Carswell, 
1997), at p. 11-2.
8 Francis v.R., [ 1956] S.C.R. 618,3 D.L.R. (2d) 641. Justice Rand was in dissent in Francis, but not 
on this point. See also Capital Cities Inc. v. Canada (CRTC), [1978] S.C.R. 141,81 D.L.R. (3d) 609. 
But see R. v. Martin, [1994] 72 O.A.C. 316 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4, where the Court held that a “general 
implementing power” could give domestic effect to an international treaty, even in the absence of 
express transformation. The power was granted merely “to implement an intergovernmental 
arrangements and commitments”.
9 See Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario (Labour Conventions Case), [ 1937] 
A.C. 326 (P.C.) at 347-48 (per Lord Atkin); see also Arrow River & Tributaries Slide & Boom Co., 
[1932] S.C.R. 495, at 510 (per Lamont J.)
10 See generally J. W. Perry, “At the Intersection -  Australian and International Law” (1997) 71. A.L.J. 
(No. 11) 841; and S. Donaghue, “Balancing Sovereignty and International Law: The Domestic Impact 
of International Law in Australia” (1995) 17:2 Adelaide L. Rev. 213. The power to implement treaty 
obligations has historically been read into the “external affairs power” of the Federal Parliament under 
the Australian Convention.
schedule.11 Alternatively, a preambular statement may indicate that a given piece 
of legislation is passed to fulfil specific treaty commitments.12 Less direct is the 
common Canadian practice of “inferred implementation” through the enactment of 
new legislation or through the amendment of existing legislation.13 Whether this 
form of inferred implementation constitutes real “transformation” is a hard question, 
one that leads to considerable pressure being placed on our courts to sort out the 
status of the treaty commitment, an issue that gives rise to various interpretative 
difficulties. Even greater difficulties arise when “transformation” is said to occur as 
a result of prior statutory, common law, or even administrative policy conformity 
with the new treaty obligation.14
Courts have traditionally attempted to deal with the wide-ranging uncertainties 
of statutory transformation of treaty obligations by invoking judicially-crafted 
interpretative presumptions. The first presumption is that if a domestic statute is 
read as transforming a treaty, a court should have reference to the treaty to interpret 
the act, and to the international law rules of treaty interpretation to interpret the 
treaty.15 In practice, this has meant that interpretation will depend principally upon 
the court’s understanding of Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
11 See R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction o f Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 
396 [hereinafter Sullivan]. See, e.g., the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Implementation Act, 
S.C. 1988, c.32 [not in force at 13.12.2000]. Even express incorporation in a statute may be read 
narrowly, with a court seeking the precise intention of Parliament to “transform” specific treaty 
provisions. In Pfizer v. The Queen, [1999] 4 F.C. 441, the Federal Court held that referential 
incorporation of the WTO Agreement (cast as approval of the treaty) did not constitute “transformation”. 
On the other hand, in R.\. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, the Supreme Court 
relied on mere references to an international treaty to interpret the “purposes” of an Act that did not 
expressly transform the treaty.
12 See R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213.
13 See Sullivan, supra note 11.
M See the discussion of so-called “passive incorporation” in E. Brandon, “How International Are Our 
Courts?” [unpublished manuscript on file with author] (2000), at 18-19,21 and 22.
15 The restrictive approach of Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Commission, [ 1982] 1 S.C.R. 1092 at 1098 
(per Estey J); and Capital Cities Inc. v. Canada (CRTC'), supra note 8 at 173 (per Laskin C.J.) (where 
only manifest statutory “ambiguity” would allow reference to an underlying treaty obligation for 
purposes of interpretation), has not recently been followed, with the Supreme Court moving to the 
position established in 1984 by the Ontario Court of Appeal. See R. v. Palacios ( 1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 
112 (Ont. C.A.); National Corn Growers Association v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 
1324, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 449 [hereinafter National Corn Growers\, Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, 
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; and, most recently, Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Pushpanathan],
o f  Treaties.16 Although I commend the approach, I would caution that mere 
reference to the Vienna Convention rules may not provide a rich understanding of 
the complexity of treaty interpretation. There is simply no golden rule of treaty 
interpretation. In international law practice “purposive” approaches are mixed with 
“plain meaning” approaches in a rather unprincipled mélange.17
Other presumptions are more important when the status of treaty transformation 
is less clear. Without having to opine on the precise direct effect of a given treaty 
within Canadian law, courts have been able to offer flexible presumptions such that 
in interpreting Canadian statutes one should presume that a legislature intended to 
act in conformity with Canada’s international obligations,18 or, alternatively phrased, 
that a court should strive to interpret a provision so as to be consistent with 
international law.19 The latter presumption has been widely invoked in cases under 
the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, which makes sense given that the 
Charter nowhere states expressly that it is transforming international treaty 
commitments. Vague presumptions are all that is available to our courts. As 
concerns the Charter, the presumption has been rephrased as a more positive 
obligation to use international human rights law as “guidance” in interpretation.20 
The lead was taken by former Chief Justice Dickson who suggested that because the 
Charter accords with the contemporary spirit of the international human rights 
movement, international human rights law should be “relevant and persuasive” in
16 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331.
17 Compare the world court’s approach to treaty interpretation in the Interpretation o f Peace Treaties 
Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65 and [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 221 (Second Phase) to that in the Reparations Case, 
[1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174.
11 See, e.g., Daniels v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517 at 541.
19 See, e.g., National Com Growers Association, supra note 15; Zingre v. The Queen, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 
392, at 409-10 (per Dickson J).; and Pushpanathan, supra note 15. The presumption was phrased in 
wide terms by Justice MacKay of the Federal Court in José Pereira E. Hijos S. A. v. Canada (Attorney 
General) (T.D.), [1997] 2 F.C. 84 at para. 20:
In construing domestic law, whether statutory or common law, the courts will seek to avoid 
construction or application that would conflict with the accepted principles of international 
law.
20 In/?, v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 837-38 (perMcLachlin J.) [hereinafter Keegstra], even the 
dissenters held that s.2 (b) of the Charter should be interpreted “as a matter of construction” in a manner 
consistent with international approaches. But their concern was not to allow international law to restrict 
the full scope of Charter rights. On the latter point, see also R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 at para. 
147 (per Bastarache J.).
Charter interpretation.21 The persuasiveness of international law seems especially 
strong in interpreting s. 1 of the Charter, most probably because its reference to a 
“free and democratic society” invites international comparisons.22
In the 1987 Labour trilogy, Chief Justice Dickson attempted to introduce a 
distinction between general international human rights law which served as the 
context for the Charter’s adoption and was therefore “relevant and persuasive” in 
Charter interpretation, and human rights treaties to which Canada is a party, which 
would serve as the benchmark for all Charter rights. The Charter should be 
presumed to guarantee protection “at least as great” as that afforded under Canada’s 
treaty obligations.23 The Court subsequently ignored this distinction. This is a loss, 
not only in Charter cases, but in all cases where international law is invoked. That 
part of international law that is “inside” Canada is not only persuasive, it is 
obligatory. When we fail to uphold our obligations, we tell a story that undermines 
respect for law internationally.
The interpretative presumptions articulated by our Courts have not been 
adequate to deal with the uncertainty caused by the practices of various legislatures 
and governments in treaty transformation. I do not blame the courts. How can they 
deal cogently with utterly inconsistent practice and even open hypocrisy? The 
problem is revealed by the case of treaties ratified by Canada but which remain 
“untransformed” -  at least in explicit terms -  into Canadian law. This governmental 
approach is especially common vis-à-vis human rights treaties. In the absence of 
express legislative transformations, are solemn international obligations of the 
Canadian Government to be given no account by Canadian courts? One might be 
tempted to say “yes — that is the nature of our constitutional system”. But what if 
the point is put somewhat differently? Canada ratifies an international treaty on the 
basis o f prior domestic law conformity. The Government then responds to the 
questioning of international treaty monitoring bodies by saying that Canada has
21 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 348 (per Dickson
C.J. in dissent, though not on this point) [hereinafter The Labour Trilogy]. See also the discussion in
G. V. La Forest, ‘The Use of International and Foreign Materials in the Supreme Court of Canada” 
(1988) 17 Can. Council Int. L. 230 at 232-33.
22 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056-57 (per Dickson C.J.), 59
D.L.R. (4th) 416; Keegstra, supra note 20. ; and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [ 1989] 1 
S.C.R. 927.
23 The Labour Trilogy, supra note 21 at 350. See also Schabas, supra note 6 at 186 and G. Van Ert, 
“International Law in Canada [:] Principles, Customs, Treaties and Rights” (2000) (unpublished Master 
of Laws Thesis, University of Toronto).
already implemented its treaty obligations. Should courts simply defer to a 
subsequent government argument that the international treaty obligation has no 
relevance because it has not been expressly “transformed”? What of the assertion 
of prior compliance? What of Canada’s reputation for good faith in reporting upon 
implementation as an aspect of its treaty obligations? Should the government be 
held to its word?
These sorts of questions must have influenced the majority judgment in Baker 
v. Canada,24 a controversial decision that has already generated significant debate.25 
Baker involved both the statutory basis for, and the proper scope of, Ministerial 
discretion concerning a deportation order. Ms. Baker was an illegal immigrant who 
had lived in Canada, supporting herself as a nanny, since 1981. In 1992 an 
immigration officer ordered her deportation. Since 1981, Ms. Baker had given birth 
to four children in Canada. They were Canadian citizens. She also had four children 
in Jamaica. After the birth of her last child, Ms. Baker was diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia. To prevent her deportation and the consequent separation from her 
Canadian children, for two of whom she was sole caregiver, Ms. Baker requested an 
exemption from the rule that one must apply for permanent residency from outside 
Canada. Under the Immigration Act16 and Regulations27 an exception was available 
on humanitarian or compassionate grounds. The application was denied, and the 
Immigration Officer’s notes, including disparaging comments about Ms. Baker, and 
about Canadian immigration policy, were submitted in evidence at trial.
The Supreme Court’s decision,per  Justice L ’Heureux-Dubé, was complex and 
wide-ranging, necessarily focussing upon process standards in administrative law. 
For our purposes, however, the key ruling was that even though Canada had never 
explicitly transformed its obligations under the Convention on the Rights o f  the 
ChilcF into domestic law, an immigration official is nonetheless bound to consider 
the “values” expressed in that Convention when exercising discretion. In the Baker 
case, the Convention's emphasis upon “the best interests of the child” should have
24 Baker v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,174 D.L.R. (4th) 
193.
25 See, e.g., Knop, supra note 4; Schabas supra, note 6; and S.J. Toope, “The Uses of Metaphor: 
International Law and the Supreme Court of Canada” [2001] Can. Bar Rev. 534.
26 R.S.C., c. 1-2,114(2)(1985).
27 S.O.R./78-172, s. 2.1 (1978).
28 United Nations Convention on the Rights o f the Child, 20 November 1989,1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
weighed heavily in considering Ms. Baker’s application. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
stated, and a majority of the Court agreed, that “the values reflected in international 
human rights law may help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation 
and judicial review.”29 Justices Iacobucci and Cory dissented on this point, stating 
that the Court should go no further than to reaffirm the traditional presumption of 
statutory confirmity with international obligations.30 The idea that untransformed 
international “values” should shape Canadian law was cause for concern, just as it 
was some fifty-four years earlier when a judge of the Ontario Supreme Court took 
an analogous approach in Re Drummond Wren,31 suggesting that international 
perspectives should shape Canadian “public policy” which would in turn affect 
statutory interpretation. Most Canadian constitutional lawyers have treated Re 
Drummond Wren as a noble aberration. However, Baker may turn it into something 
quite different.
The Supreme Court of Canada is not alone in suggesting that values contained 
in untransformed treaty obligations may shape the proper interpretation of domestic 
law. In the equally controversial decision of Minister o f  Immigration & Ethnic 
Affairs v. Teoh,32 the Australian High Court invoked the doctrine of “legitimate 
expectations” to give rise to a procedural right to notice and an opportunity to 
present argument if a statutory decision-maker proposed to act contrary to the terms 
of a ratified but unimplemented treaty.33 Chief Justice Mason and Justice Deane 
held that the fact of non-transformation does not mean that ratification holds no 
significance for Australian law, both statutory -  and with care and reticence -  even 
common law. Their reasoning can be analogized to the doctrine of “holding out” as 
an element of good faith:
ratification of an international convention is not to be dismissed as a merely
platitudinous or ineffectual act. Rather, it is a positive statement by the Executive
29 Baker, supra note 24, at para. 70.
30 Ibid. per Iacobucci J. (dissenting in part).
31 Re Drummond Wren, [1945] O.R. 778 (Ont. S.C.).
32 (1995), 183 C.L.R. 273. See also the New Zealand case of Tavita v. Minister o f Immigration, [1994]
2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.); and the Indian case of Vishoka v. Rajasthan, [1997] 3 L.R.C. 361 (S.C. India), 
cited in Baker to support the broad proposition that international human rights law can be used by 
common law courts to aid in the interpretation of domestic law.
33 For generally favourable commentary on Teoh, see Donaghue, supra note 10; and P. Mathew, 
“International Law and the Protection ofHuman Rights in Australia: Recent Trends” (1995) 17 Sydney 
L. Rev. 177. For critical observations, see P. Heerey, “Storytelling, Postmodernism and the Law” (2000) 
74 The Australian L.J. 681.
to the world and to the citizens that the Executive and its agencies will act in
accordance with the convention.34
The Teoh decision caused apoplexy within the Australian government, and various 
bills were lodged in Parliament to overturn the judgment.35 Such legislation was 
unnecessary even for those opposed to the Court’s approach in Teoh, since the Court 
had already provided an escape hatch for the government. A mere “Executive 
Statement” could oust any “legitimate expectation.” Shortly after the judgment, 
such a general “Executive Statement” was issued covering all ratified but 
unimplemented treaties. Governments are jealous of their wiggle room!
Baker and Teoh are salutory challenges to governmental hypocrisy (or perhaps 
incompetence) in ratifying international treaties and failing to address the domestic 
law implications of those treaties. Viewing unratified treaties as persuasive authority 
in interpreting domestic statutes and in shaping administrative discretion is a healthy 
development. As Justice Brennan argued in the famous Australian case on 
aboriginal property rights, Mabo II, international law can serve to provide “a basic 
legal environment” in which domestic law rights can be recognized.36 This 
observation is more compelling if one considers treaty commitments undertaken 
voluntarily by national governments.
William Schabas was right in suggesting, however, that Baker was also a missed 
opportunity.37 That the opportunity was missed is not surprising, for the failure 
flows from the most perplexing problem facing anyone trying to understand the 
relationship between international law and domestic law in Canada: the effect to be 
given to customary international law. In Baker, the Supreme Court could have 
concluded that the “best interests of the child” test has solidified as a norm of 
customary international law. One would not, then, have been forced implicitly to 
apply an untransformed treaty rule. Instead, the Court would have had to clarify the 
age-old question whether international customary law forms part of the law of 
Canada. Back in 1972, Ronald St. J. Macdonald argued convincingly that until the
34 Teoh, supra note 32, at para. 34 (per Mason C.J. and Deane J.). It should be noted that there is 
considerable doubt as to the “stability” of the Teoh decision given changes in the composition of the 
High Court. See Donaghue, ibid. at 253.
35 See Heerey, supra note 33, at 690.
36 Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1. On international law as relevant “context”, see 
also Schabas, supra note 6, at 186 (here regarding the “context” for adoption of the Canadian Charter 
o f Rights and Freedoms).
37 Schabas, ibid. at 182.
confusing judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Foreign Legations 
Case,38 Canadian law was relatively consistent in favouring a “monist” theory under 
which customary law applied in Canada of its own force.39
Since Foreign Legations, Canadian Courts have vacillated on the status of 
customary international law in Canada.40 Since the advent of the Charter, the 
situation has not improved. While international human rights law has consistently 
been held to be relevant and persuasive, the Supreme Court has never clarified when 
customary international law might be compelling or even binding. One could, of 
course, read Justice La Forest’s reasons in Kindler as at least accepting implicitly 
that a customary law rule could directly shape Canadian law. He emphasized the 
importance of universal practice and international consensus in shaping norms that 
would have an impact in Canada. Although he used different words, the analysis is 
close to the traditional invocation of practice and opino juris as the measure of 
existence for customary law. In Justice La Forest’s view, the norm against the death 
penalty was not strong enough to guide domestic law — unlike norms against 
genocide, slavery and torture.41 Query whether or not U.S.A. v. Burns andRajfay42 
can be read to support the emergence of a binding customary law rule against the
38 Reference as to Powers to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioners ’ Residences 
[1943] S.C.R. 208.
39 Macdonald, supra note 6, at 109.
40 See, e.g., Municipality o f Saint John v. Fraser-Brace Overseas Corp., [1958] S.C.R. 263 (seeming to 
favour direct incorporation); La République Démocratique du Congo v. Venne, [1971] S.C.R. 997 
(where changes to customary law did not operate automatically within Canadian law); and Reference 
Re Mineral and Other Natural Resources ofthe Continental Shelf( 1983), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Nfld. C. A.) 
(implicitly requiring transformation of customaiy law).
41 Kindler v. Canada (Minister o f Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, at 833 (per La Forest J.), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 
438). It should be noted that Australian courts have also been struggling with the question of customary 
international law’s role in the domestic legal system. See Mathew, supra note 33, at 194-95. In Israel, 
the Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of the direct operation of customary international law 
in Israeli law, but has reduced the effect of this approach by imposing a heavy burden to prove the 
existence of custom. It seems likely that the reason for this burdensome imposition is that the cases on 
custom have usually arisen in contexts where national security concerns are strong. See E. Benvenisti, 
“The Attitude of the Supreme Court of Israel Towards the Implementation of the International Law of 
Human Rights” in B. Conforti & F. Francioni, eds, Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic 
Courts, International Studies in Human Rights, vol. 49 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) 
202 at 209-213. Within the United States legal system, customaiy law is applied automatically and is 
controlling unless displaced by domestic positive law. The Paquette Habana (1900), 175 U.S. 677. See 
also H.A. Blackmun, “The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations” (1994) 104 Yale L.J. 39 
(demonstrating that “positive law” seems often to displace international customary law).
42 (15 Februaiy 2001) SCC File 26129; <www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc>.
death penalty.
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court, in answering an 
argument put by the amicus curiae, hinted that it would not have jurisdiction to 
decide questions of “pure international law.”43 If this means simply that customary 
law becomes part of “the laws of Canada” for the purposes of the Court’s 
jurisdiction under s. 3 of the Supreme Court Act,44 the observation is 
unobjectionable. If, on the other hand, the implication is that the Supreme Court 
cannot directly apply international customary law, this would be unfortunate, for the 
well-known reasons offered up by Lord Denning in the Trendtex case.45 Given that 
the Supreme Court’s international law analysis in the Secession Reference failed 
completely to engage with the customary law on self-determination, a dualist 
position may unfortunately have been implicitly adopted.46 In the upcoming Suresh 
case, the Supreme Court will be given an opportunity to clarify their position. The 
Court should finally allow Canada to align itself firmly with the eminently sensible 
U.S. and U.K. positions. The Court could do worse than simply reaffirming the 
observation of Robertson JA, in the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Suresh :
principles of customary international law may be recognized and applied in 
Canadian Courts as part of the domestic law,... in so far as those principles do not 
conflict with domestic law.47
This statement accepts the need for automatic incorporation, but upholds the 
democratic accountability of domestic legislatures and courts. The opportunity for 
plain speaking on this thorny question was missed in Baker and should now be taken 
up.
43 Reference re Secession o f Québec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at paras. 11-12.
44 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 3.
45 Trendtex Trading Corp. v. The Central Bank o f Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.) (stressing (a) the 
need for domestic legal systems to allow changing international law to effect internal change as well; 
and (b) the reciprocity inherent in “comity” and its value for internationally engaged states). See also 
Macdonald, supra note 6 at 111.
46 See S.J. Toope, Case Comment [on the Secession Reference] (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 519.
47 Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration [2000] 2 F.C. 592 (F.C.A.); (2000) 183
D.L.R. (4th) 629 at 659 per Robertson J.A.
The Power of Storytellers
The issue of customary international law’s status within Canadian law returns to the 
themes of The Storyteller. Our official storytellers have thus far failed to develop 
a compelling narrative. International law is both inside and outside Canadian law. 
The Canadian story of international law is not merely a story of “persuasive” foreign 
law. International law also speaks directly to Canadian law and requires it to be 
shaped in certain directions. International law is more than “comparative law”, 
because international law is partly our law. The decisions that we take in Canada, 
in our government policies, in our legislative acts and in our courts, contribute to the 
wider story of international law around the globe. The Secession Reference will 
contribute to the law of self-determination. Canada’s efforts to protect the arctic 
environment have already changed rules of territory and the law of the sea.48 The 
politically charged decision to protect straddling fish stocks by using force has 
arguably led to new international regulation on conservation of this increasingly 
scarce resource.49
The process of relating international law to domestic law is not a translation of 
norms from outside. Rather, Canadian voices join with foreign voices, weaving an 
increasingly rich and multi-textured narrative of international law. Oftentimes, the 
story will be one of persuasion, but sometimes the story will be one of obligation — 
to norms that we have helped to articulate through processes of interaction and the 
construction of shared expectations.50
None of this would surprise Saul Zuratas, a.k.a. Tasurinchi. Over time, this 
Machiguengas storyteller reaches into his own past as a Jew and he begins to weave 
together mythologies of Amazonia and the ancient middle east. As his own 
acceptance into the Machiguengas is complete, he is free to allow different stories 
to blend together, stories from inside and outside. Ultimately, Tasurinchi blends 
together even the name of the creator. The great spirit of the Machiguengas 
becomes known in Tasurinchi’s stories, in part, as Jehova. The story of one people’s 
remarkable survival is linked to another people’s survival. The joining of stories is
48 See, e.g., M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power o f Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1999), at 92-97.
49 The point here is descriptive, rather than normative. My own view is that Canada’s use of force to 
seize a Spanish trawler on the high seas was both illegal and unwise.
50 J. Brunnée & S.J. Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory 
of International Law” (2000) 39 Col. J. Trans. L. 19.
not a denial of the specificity o f culture but a recognition that stories build together
-  protecting and reshaping cultures.
The process of Michiguengas storytelling moves the Peruvian author 
immeasurably, just as the story of building allegiance to international law can move 
us today. For ours is a story of resisting the weight of mere power, of upholding the 
sanctity of nature, of struggling to promote respect for all persons, of fulfilling our 
need to connect with one another. Remember E.M. Forster’s invocation: “only 
connect”. Storytelling is a tremendous gift, a gift that helps us connect. The 
reflections of our anonymous Peruvian author -  undoubtedly close in thought to the 
living author, Vargas Llosa -  offer fitting closure:
I was deeply moved by the thought o f that being, those beings, in the unhealthy 
forests of eastern Cusco and Madré de Dios, making long journeys of days or weeks, 
bringing stories from one group of Machiguengas to another and taking away 
others...
... the fleeting, perhaps legendary figures of those ... [storytellers] who — by 
occupation, out of necessity, to satisfy a human whim — using the simplest, most 
time-hallowed of expedients, the telling of stories, were the living sap that circulated 
and made the Machiguengas into a society, a people of interconnected and 
interdependent beings.51
From inside Canada, we can join with those outside, telling the story of international 
law, and helping to create a human society of interconnected and interdependent 
beings.
51 Supra note 1 at 93.
